The Audit Trail module currently logs all attributes of an audited entity using administrator privileges, regardless of the access rules defined on those attributes. This becomes a problem when an entity contains sensitive data.
A common scenario: a value is encrypted (e.g. via a BCO flow) and stored in a dedicated attribute, with the original attribute cleared afterwards. Even when all access to that encrypted attribute has been revoked at the entity level, both the emptied original value and the encrypted value still appear in the audit log. Using a Hash-type attribute isn't a workaround here, because the stored value needs to remain decryptable, which also rules out the exclusion capability offered by Advanced Audit Trail.
It would be very valuable to have control over which attributes are written to the audit trail. This could be implemented in one of two ways:
Either approach would let teams keep meaningful audit coverage while ensuring sensitive attribute values don't end up exposed in the audit logs.